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gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca
May 5, 2015, revised May 6 [to incorporate a copy-edit]
The debate over ISDS in Europe has generated several examples of how the term
“reform” can be used to promote investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS), without
altering the essential transfer of power and effective subsidy inherent in ISDS.
The most recent proposal emerging from the European Commission is an example. As I
explain in this paper, the most recent proposal (a) reflects a move away from essentially
fake reforms to something potentially more meaningful but (b) is insufficient to satisfy
the minimum criteria of independence, fairness, openness, subsidiarity, and balance,
and (c) is not reliable until it is backed by clear language and a negotiating red line for
any agreement providing for ISDS.
A. Introduction
In this paper I examine the Commission’s new concept paper on ISDS in the proposed
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The Commission’s approach
builds on the ISDS model already purportedly agreed by the European Commission in
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada and the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with Singapore.
I reproduce large sections of the concept paper to respond to and at times debunk them.
The details behind most of my responses are elaborated in other documents, especially
my submission to the European Commission’s public consultation on ISDS in 2014 and
a more recent paper on the flaws with ISDS in the TTIP and CETA. These other papers
are available at http://ssrn.com/author=638855.
My primary message is that the Commission’s approach to reform is seriously
inadequate. The Commission must by now be well aware of fundamental flaws in ISDS
and the threat it poses to democracy, courts, and public budgets. It must also be aware
that the evidence to show that ISDS delivers a public benefit commensurate with the
potentially huge public subsidy it provides, mostly to large corporations and very
wealthy individuals, is sparse at best. Yet, ISDS is still clearly being pushed hard by the
Commission, as well as North American and some European governments, in a
context—relations among countries with established democratic and judicial
institutions—where it is clearly unjustified and likely to do significant harm to public
institutions. Simply, the current push for ISDS is at the forefront of the situations in
which voters and taxpayers are losing out badly, due to legal reforms that benefit most
clearly the most powerful and wealthy economic actors in the world.
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B. Response to the Commission’s initial claims about reform
The Commission’s concept paper begins with this “starting point”:
International investment rules were invented in Europe. Today, EU Member States are parties
to almost half of the total number of international investment agreements that are currently in
force worldwide (roughly to 1400 out of 3000). These agreements, almost all of which
include both investment protection and investor-to-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) (which
allows disputes between an investor and a State when the latter is alleged to have breached its
commitments under an international investment agreement to be resolved) – have played
their part in encouraging and protecting the high volume of EU investment abroad and,
reciprocally, the investments held by the rest of the world in the EU.

This statement is misleading because the Commission does not make clear that
international investment rules “were invented in Europe” as a means to discipline
newly-independent countries among former colonies. The thrust of proposed treaties
like the TTIP, CETA, and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is to extend those antidemocratic, non-judicial rules to developed countries too.
The Commission’s statement also contains misleading information, by now well-worn
as a sales pitch for ISDS, on the large number of existing treaties that allow for ISDS.
Yet, the vast majority of those treaties are unlikely ever to lead to claims. Also, just a
few new treaties, led by TTIP, would roughly triple the scope of ISDS judging by the
amount of foreign investment flows to which ISDS would be directly applicable. We
are at a major turning point in the potential expansion and locking-in of ISDS as a
supreme decision-making body for the world.
Lastly, the Commission says that existing treaties “have played their part” in
encouraging and protecting investments from and to Europe. Most clearly, this playing
of their part has led to the transfer of billions of dollars in public funds to very large
companies and very wealthy individual (and to ISDS lawyers and arbitrators). On the
question of whether the treaties have encouraged or protected investments in a more
general way, the evidence is at best mixed. If the treaties were more clearly named to
reflect their direct financial effect of the treaties, they would be called Agreements to
Transfer Public Money to Foreign Owners of Assets, Lawyers, and Arbitrators.
The Commission continues by offering this rationale for the “need for a new EU
approach”:
The key challenge for the EU's reformed investment policy is the need to ensure that the goal
of protecting and encouraging investment does not affect the ability of the EU and its Member
States to continue to pursue public policy objectives. A major part of that challenge is to make
sure that any system for dispute settlement is fair and independent. The EU has already begun
to address these challenges, through interactions with EU stakeholders and through the
process of negotiation of the first generation of EU trade agreements that included investment
protection and ISDS.

Clearly, if the Commission’s goal was to avoid interfering with the ability of
legislatures and governments to “pursue public policy objectives” and if the goal was to
safeguard existing judicial processes that are “fair and independent”, the best way to
achieve those goals would be to avoid giving foreign investors the ability to attack laws
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and regulations by threatening a financially-dangerous ISDS lawsuit against the
European Union or a member country. As such, it is a key flaw in the Commission’s
approach to ISDS that the Commission does not lay out a compelling, evidence-based
case that ISDS—as an effective subsidy for the most powerful and wealthy actors in the
world—provides a benefit to the public. Such a case is not laid out in the Commission’s
concept paper or any of its other publications on ISDS.
C. Response to the Commission’s claims about its reform “so far” in the CETA
Next, the Commission turns to what it has “achieved so far” in its reforms of ISDS in
order to preserve public policy objectives and ensure that dispute resolution is fair and
independent. As evidence, the Commission provides a list of examples, each of which I
critique briefly below. In my criticism, I focus on the public text of the Canada-Europe
CETA, not the Singapore-Europe FTA, although both are essentially the same for
purposes of ISDS and its threat to democracy, courts, and public budgets.
The Commission’s first example of a purported achievement is this:
We have reaffirmed the right to regulate. In CETA we have made clear in the preamble of the
agreement that the EU and Canada preserve their right to regulate and to achieve legitimate
policy objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the
promotion and protection of cultural diversity.

I think it strong but fair to say that this claim approaches the level of a fraud on the
public. The key problem legally is that, by affirming the right to regulate in the CETA’s
preamble (and its labour and environment chapters) but not in the CETA’s investment
chapter, the CETA has created an implication that the preamble’s affirmation of the
right to regulate was intentionally not meant for the investment chapter. Otherwise,
why did the parties not include it in the investment chapter as they did in other CETA
chapters?
The Commission’s next example is as follows:
We have defined key concepts like “fair and equitable treatment” and “indirect
expropriation”, in order to prevent abuse. For the first time, CETA provides a definition of
these terms. "Fair and equitable treatment" is defined through a clear, closed text which
defines precisely the content of the standard without leaving unwelcome discretion to
arbitrators. Moreover, detailed language has been agreed upon to clarify what constitutes
indirect expropriation, particularly excluding claims against legitimate public policy
measures.

However, the approach to these concepts certainly does not prevent abuse or protect
reliably the right to regulate, though it takes a long time to explain. To illustrate
briefly, the approach taken in the CETA to “fair and equitable treatment” creates a
greater risk of abuse and a greater threat to the right to regulate than the longstanding
approach of Canada and the U.S. in NAFTA. I elaborated on the details of this issue in
my submission to the Commission’s public consultation in 2014 (available on the link I
mentioned earlier in this paper).
My sadness here is that the Commission is relying on the inability of the public and
policy-makers to look closely at the technical details of the law of ISDS to find out just
how much the Commission’s approach sacrifices the “right to regulate” and, in turn,
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how it undermines democratic choice, judicial finality, regulatory flexibility, and
public budgets.
The Commission continues:
We have prevented practices by investors such as "forum shopping", that is trying to pick the
most suitable agreement to bring an ISDS claim. For example, the making of an investment or
business re-organisation for the purpose of bringing a case (as is alleged Philip Morris has
done to bring its case against Australia) is explicitly prohibited in CETA. No other ISDS
agreement contains such a provision. Moreover, “mailbox” companies will not be able to
bring cases to arbitration. Only companies with real business operations in the territory of
one of the Parties will be covered by the investment protection provisions.

The Commission’s approach in the CETA has limited the risk of forum-shopping, but it
has not prevented it. Many U.S. companies will be able to sue the European Union and
its member states under the CETA because the U.S. companies have “real business
operations”, as the Commission puts it, in Canada.
The Canadian economy is largely an extension of the U.S. economy and it is heavily
U.S.-owned. When Canadian business organizations lobby for ISDS, one has to keep in
mind that many members of those organizations are ultimately U.S. or other foreign
investors in Canada.
Indeed, the whole “mailbox” company issue because largely moot if European
countries accept ISDS with the U.S. and, to a significant extent, if they accept it with
Canada. There is little need to exploit mailbox companies when U.S. companies or
their subsidiaries in Canada can sue directly under the TTIP or CETA.
The Commission then turns to the issue of openness in ISDS:
We have introduced full, mandatory transparency of the arbitration process. CETA
incorporates the UNCITRAL rules on transparency which will mean that all documents
(submissions by the disputing parties, decisions of the tribunal) will be made publicly
available. All hearings will be open to the public. Interested parties (NGOs, trade unions)
will be able to make submissions.

I give credit to the Commission for moving away from the (frankly scandalous)
acceptance of large-scale secrecy in ISDS by many member states. However, as I
elaborated in my submission to the Commission in 2014, the CETA approach still
allows for secret settlements with foreign investors—potentially involving changes to
government decisions or public pay-outs—before an ISDS document is filed. It also
allows issues of confidentiality in ISDS to be resolved outside of a judicial process.
The Commission continues:
We have given governments, not arbitrators, ultimate control over the interpretation of the
rules. Under CETA, the EU and Canada can issue binding interpretations on how the
provisions should be interpreted, and the ISDS Tribunal is obliged to respect those
interpretations. These binding interpretations can also be made with respect to on- going
ISDS cases. The ability for the Parties to the agreement to adopt binding interpretations is a
safety valve in the event of errors by the tribunals (the likelihood of which is in any event
eliminated by the clear drafting of the relevant investment protection standards).

The Commission is greatly overstating the ability of governments to reign in
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arbitrators using the reactive and legalistic mechanism that is highlighted here.
As I elaborated in my submission to the Commission in 2014, the mechanism of
binding interpretations was always in NAFTA but has been used only twice, over a
decade ago, to respond to adventurous interpretations of ISDS arbitrators. It is a
lumbering mechanism not well-suited to regulating the immense but nimble power of
ISDS arbitrators to interpret vague treaty language and, in turn, to discipline
legislatures, governments, and courts and to re-allocate public funds.
The Commission also refers to the issue of arbitrator independence and impartiality:
We have included, for the first time, a code of conduct for arbitrators, ensuring the
respect of high ethical and professional standards. CETA sets out precise and clearly defined
procedures to follow to ensure full impartiality of arbitrators, for instance by requiring full
disclosure of any situation which could give rise to real or perceived conflicts of interest
(for instance previous work or links to law firms). CETA also includes concrete steps to
allow to determine whether a conflict could arise or has arisen. In case an arbitrator is
found not to comply with the code, he/she will be replaced.

This reliance on a code of conduct was an extraordinarily weak response to the
fundamental issues of independence and impartiality in ISDS. It did not put in place
the usual institutional safeguards such as secure tenure, a set salary, an objective
method of case assignment, and prohibitions on double-dipping as a lawyer and
arbitrator. Even the provision for disclosure in the aspirational code, as mentioned
here, cannot be reliably enforced due to the existence of secret ISDS cases that make it
impossible for any outside party to verify whether an arbitrator has engaged in
activities prohibited by the code. Again, these issues are elaborated in detail in my
submission to the Commission in 2014.
The Commission also notes:
We have created rules ensuring the early dismissal of unfounded claims. Under CETA we have
introduced a fast track system that will allow to reject unfounded or frivolous claims in just a
matter of weeks.

This example of a “reform” was particularly jarring to the idea of a “fair and
independent” process. Consider that the Commission was proposing here to allow
arbitrators who are paid by the case—and thus have a financial interest in the claim
going ahead—to decide whether the claim should be rejected at an early stage. I do not
suggest that all arbitrators would be affected by the financial interest, but the mere fact
of the financial interest alone would create justifiable doubts about any decision to
allow a claim to proceed. Clearly, claims should be vetted by someone who does not
profit from allowing the claim to go ahead.
The Commission also states:
We are making investors who bring a case and lose, pay for all the costs of the legal
proceedings. This "loser pays principle", introduced for the first time ever in CETA, will not
only discourage frivolous or unfounded claims but will also mean that the investor must
pay the litigation costs of the state he has challenged (at present, even if a government
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successfully defends itself, it often has to bear its litigation costs). Given the financial risk, an
investor will think twice before bringing any ISDS claim.

This “reform” operates in favour of the big players. It creates a disadvantage for
smaller investors—in comparison to deep-pocketed ones—and to smaller states, all of
which now face greater financial risks associated with ISDS litigation. In turn, for
investors there is a more pressure to avoid bringing an ISDS lawsuit, while for states
the pressure is to settle ISDS lawsuits in a way that favours deep-pocketed companies
and individuals.
On the question of an appellate body, the Commission indicates:
We have had our negotiating partners agree to work towards a future appeals mechanism.
The Commission has said already back in 2010 that an appellate mechanism has clear
added value in ensuring consistency and predictability of the system and the idea of putting
in place such a mechanism has broad support amongst EU stakeholders. CETA is the first
agreement to which the US is not a party which contains a clear commitment to the possible
creation of an appeal mechanism.

However, if the Commission was serious about an appellate body—which no country
including the U.S. has ever agreed to establish—then obviously there was a greater
opportunity to push Canada to establish one than to push the U.S. I see this aspect of
the CETA—like many others that follow the U.S. government’s approach since the
early 2000s—as part of the signaling that the Commission is prepared to accept almost
all aspects of the U.S. model of ISDS.
Finally, the Commission states:
And we oblige investors to drop cases in national courts if they want to pursue ISDS. CETA
prohibits parallel proceedings: investors cannot seek remedies in domestic courts and
through ISDS at the same time. The aim is to avoid double compensation and divergent
verdicts. Most of the over 3,000 existing investment treaties with ISDS do not have this
prohibition.

Essentially, the Commission is endorsing here a privileging of foreign investors over
everyone else in international law. Normally, a private party has to go to domestic
courts, where they are reasonably available, before bringing an international claim.
Only foreign investors have been relieved of this requirement—and the Commission
would expand this unjustified favourtism—based on an implied assumption that
foreign investors, in all cases, cannot expect adequate protection in the courts of any
country. Like everyone else, foreign investors should be required to provide evidence
to demonstrate that they cannot access justice in the domestic courts of a country
before being allowed to bring an international claim. The Commission has taken the
opposite approach, again following on the U.S. model.
D. The Commission’s proposed further reforms
After laying out these example of reforms that do not preserve policy-making flexibility
or ensure fairness and independence in dispute resolution, the Commission turns to
its purported “further” improvements and “a possible way forward” on four topics:
i) the protection of the right to regulate;
ii) the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals;
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iii) the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism; and
iv) the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS.
There are positive aspects of this further reform agenda in the first three of these
areas, but for the most part they take the same path of earlier pseudo reforms that
leave ISDS and its flaws fundamentally intact.
I also stress that, without a legal text, any commitment to “reform” is essentially
meaningless from a legal point of view. The Commission itself emphasizes (in bold)
that its new proposals for reform are “without prejudice to the final position of the
European Commission on the matters described within”. That qualifier is especially
worrying because the Commission’s credibility in communicating a reform agenda is
undermined by the fact that the Commission championed a deeply-flawed CETA text
in misleading ways when it described the CETA in the public consultation on ISDS in
2014.
E. Criteria for evaluating the Commission’s further reforms
Below, in my discussion of the Commission’s further proposals, I rely on these criteria
for evaluating ISDS:
•

Is it independent, fair, and open in its process and institutional structure?

•

Is it subsidiary in its relationship to other democratic, regulatory, and
adjudicative institutions?

•

Is it balanced in its accounting for (a) the state’s right to regulate alongside
foreign investor protections and (b) foreign investor responsibilities alongside
foreign investor rights?

I suggest that these criteria are generally consistent with the democratic constitutional
orders established or consolidated in Europe and North America during the twentieth
century. As such, the criteria should be treated as the minimum for an ISDS proposal
at the international level, if ISDS is not to undermine the basic idea that people should
be able to elect a government that can viably implement social and economic reforms,
subject to judicial protections of everyone’s fundamental rights including property
rights.
To elaborate briefly, by independent, I mean an ISDS process that is judicially
independent in the manner of a court. By fair, I mean an ISDS process that provides a
right of standing to all affected parties, including public notice of disputes in order to
allow other affected parties to apply for standing. By open, I mean an ISDS process
that is public in the manner of an open court.
By subsidiary, I mean a requirement that foreign investors must exhaust reasonablyavailable domestic remedies, that ISDS judges must not proceed in parallel to
domestic or contractually-agreed forums, and that ISDS judges should defer to
democratically-accountable legislators or expert regulators faced with policy questions
that are not well-suited for adjudication.
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By balanced, I mean the inclusion of a clear affirmation of the state’s right to regulate
in general, the provision for foreign investor responsibilities (actionable in the same
manner as foreign investor rights), and the moderation of the remedy in ISDS so that
states are not crippled in their law-making and regulatory functions by the risk of
potentially massive financial liability.
I stress that, in a treaty among countries with established democracies and
independent courts, the case for ISDS may still not be established, even if all the above
criteria have been met. That is, states may still consider that the threat to democratic
choice, judicial independence, regulatory flexibility, or public budgets is too great in
comparison to whatever public benefit is thought to come from privileging and
subsidizing foreign investors through ISDS.
F. Response to the Commission’s further reforms on the right to regulate
The Commission’s further reforms on the right to regulate are most relevant to the
above criterion of balance. That is, a clear affirmation of the right to regulate in the
investment chapter would provide at least a balance against the elaborate rights and
protections of foreign investors. Also, limitations on the dangerous ISDS remedy of
retrospective compensation would help to limit the risk of states being crippled in
their law-making and regulatory functions by financial uncertainty.
On this issue, the European Commission’s key statement is a (lukewarm) suggestion
that the TTIP “should reaffirm the right to regulate in a legal provision in the body of
the relevant chapter”. The Commission then elaborates that the provision would be:
An operational provision (an Article) which will refer to the right of Governments to take
measures to achieve legitimate public policy objectives, on the basis of the level of protection
that they deem appropriate. Such provision is recognition of the right of domestic authorities
to regulate matters within their own borders which exists already under international law. It
allows setting the right context in which investment protection standards are applied.

If this proposal reflects a serious commitment, it is positive. However, it is not possible
to evaluate the seriousness of the commitment without the legal language. Also, the
suggestion is open to questions about the clarity of the affirmation since it is possible
“refer to” the right to regulate, while rendering the right unreliable by clever drafting
and qualifiers. Indeed, the record of the Commission so far raises some doubts about
the seriousness of its commitment and about the dangers of leaving this issue to the
negotiating process controlled by the Commission and by the U.S. or Canadian
government.
To test the reliability of this reform commitment, I suggest that the starting point
should be for the Commission to release precise language as a non-negotiable red line
in the CETA, TTIP, and any other agreement that may provide for ISDS. Logically, the
Commission would begin by laying out such a provision for the CETA and FTA that
have already been negotiated (though not approved).
Beyond this commitment on the right to regulate, the Commission’s proposed reforms
are specific to limited examples of vague provisions or adventurous decisions in ISDS;
in particular, on fair and equitable treatment and state aid. The proposed reforms do
8

not envision a clear affirmation of the right to regulate and thus are relatively minor
with respect to that element of the criterion of balance.
Unfortunately, the Commission carries on with the misleading spin that the CETA, for
example, “already set a very high benchmark insofar as the protection of the right to
regulate is concerned”. The Commission bases this claim on some of the examples I
critiqued earlier. In fact, the Commission’s approach so far has done significant harm
to the legal status of the right to regulate, undermining the Commission’s credibility
on this issue.
In summary, the Commission has still not committed to a clear affirmation of the right
to regulate. More broadly, on the criterion of balance, the Commission has not
proposed any meaningful steps to moderate the financially-dangerous remedy of
restrictive damages or to include foreign investor responsibilities alongside foreign
investor rights.
G. Response to the Commission’s further reforms on arbitral tribunals
Next, the Commission turns to its proposals on “the establishment and functioning of
arbitral tribunals in order to increase legitimacy of the ISDS system”. This topic is
relevant to various criteria outlined above, including independence, fairness,
openness, and subsidiarity. Does the Commission deliver?
Unfortunately, the Commission begins with another defensive statement regarding its
past approach to the stark lack of judicial safeguards in ISDS. Even if it were true (it is
not) that the Commission’s approach to arbitrator section and ethics “is already by far
the most advanced in existence”, as the Commission claims, the approach falls well
short of basic standards of independent judging.
As the Commission acknowledges, the design of ISDS in the CETA is incompatible
with judicial independence because (a) it enables an executive official to control case
assignments and thus take steps to keep sensitive cases in safe hands, (b) it does not
rely on an effective judicial “roster” from which all cases would be assigned to roster
members on an objective basis such as rotation or lottery, (c) it relies, due to the
existence of secret ISDS cases, on the goodwill of the arbitrators to disclose
information that may give rise to a conflict of interest, (d) it subjects conflict of interest
challenges against the arbitrators to resolution by an executive official instead of a
judicial process, (e) it continues to rely on for-profit arbitrators where they are
financially dependent on foreign investors to bring more claims, and (f) it gives foreign
investors a direct role in half of the make-up of the tribunal that will determine issues
of public importance and disburse potentially vast amounts of public funds.
Despite these serious flaws, the Commission actually describes its approach to this
issue in the CETA as “a deep reform of the system”. That statement is so misleading as
to suggest the Commission lacks commitment to judicial independence in this context.
On the other hand, the Commission is more up front that its current approach is
procedurally unfair because it does not “specifically provide for [a] right to intervene
to persons with a clear and concrete interest in the case”.
These points highlighted by the Commission relate to the criteria of independence and
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fairness, elaborated above. What further reforms does the Commission propose on
these criteria?
On the positive side, for independence, the Commission proposes that all arbitrators
would be chosen from a roster, the members of which are chosen by the states parties
to the Agreement and are assigned to specific cases in an objective way. In particular:
A requirement that all arbitrators are chosen from a roster pre-established by the Parties
to the Agreement (they could then be chosen either by lot or by choice of the disputing
parties). This option would not present technical difficulties, and would allow to “break
the link” between the parties to the dispute and the arbitrators. It would mean that all
arbitrators have been vetted by the Parties.

Again, assuming that this is a serious commitment, it is a positive step that goes a
significant way to addressing the lack of independence in ISDS.
Beyond this commitment, however, the Commission’s proposals on qualifications for
arbitrators are not significant. Indeed, the Commission says that the qualifications for
arbitrators would focus on applying “international law as contained in the
agreement”. I take this statement as a signal to the ISDS industry that core members of
the arbitration “club” will continue to play a prominent role. Considering how
adventurously those core members have exercised their ISDS power, the Commission’s
approach, in my view, is a serious mistake. It would be much more reassuring if the
Commission had signaled that other fields of expertise, such as public law and human
rights (including property rights), would be represented among the roster members.
On the issue of fairness, the Commission briefly—but positively—says that the
European Union proposal “should confer a right to intervene to third parties with a
direct and existing interest in the outcome of a dispute”. That would be an important
step to address the current lack of fairness, although it is difficult to evaluate the
proposal without a discussion of the notice requirements and rules of procedure
needed to make the right operational (and in the absence of a legal text). It would also
be more reassuring if the Commission had referred to “a right of standing” rather than
“a right to intervene”; from my common law-based perspective, a right to intervene is
a lesser right of participation than a right of standing.
Unfortunately, the negative aspects of the Commission’s proposals are significant,
especially on independence. My key concerns are that (a) the Commission still refers
to arbitrators rather than judges, (b) the semantic point in (a) is important because the
Commission does not commit to the arbitrators being paid a set salary instead of
operating for-profit, (c) the Commission does not replace the role of executive officials
in deciding conflict of interest claims with a proper judicial process and (d) the
Commission does not commit to prohibiting arbitrators on the roster from working as
ISDS lawyers during (or from having worked as ISDS lawyers for a reasonable period
of, say, five years before and after) their service on the roster.
These gaps lead to the concern that the roster will end up populated or dominated by
the same group of arbitrators who have misused ISDS power to date. The gaps in the
Commission’s proposals also intensify my concern that the proposals are not
accompanied by precise language tied to clear red lines.
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I stress that these limitations in the Commission’s proposal are vital because of the
fundamental nature of the criteria of independence and fairness for an international
adjudicative process that can override legislatures, governments, and courts and that
carries potentially major financial implications for countries.
H. Response to the Commission’s further reforms on an appellate body
The Commission also proposes an appellate mechanism in ISDS. On this topic, the
Commission makes a significant statement—relevant to the criteria of independence
and perhaps balance—as follows:
The EU proposal should include a bilateral appellate mechanism for ISDS. The EU text
should lay out its role, its set-up and practical operation. The appellate mechanism would
review awards as regards errors of law and manifest errors in the assessment of facts (this
would include an incorrect factual treatment of domestic law as interpreted by domestic
courts), ensure consistency in the interpretation of TTIP and increase legitimacy both on
substance and through institutional design by strengthening independence, impartiality and
predictability.

This is a positive, though still aspirational, description of an appellate body. The most
positive aspect, to my eye, is that the statement includes details that indicate a degree
of thought about what an appellate body would need to do. Also, the outline of issues
that an appellate mechanism is proposed to consider is reasonable, especially because
it includes issues of legal interpretation. That said, a lingering concern is that the
appellate body would merely be superimposed on the for-profit arbitration process.
The Commission’s statement continues by describing the appellate body as,
effectively, a judicial body:
The bilateral appellate mechanism could be modelled largely on the institutional set-up of the
WTO Appellate Body, with some adaptations both to make it specific for ISDS, and in light of
experience in the WTO. There could be 7 permanent members (2 from each Party, 3 nonnationals) whose qualifications could be broadly similar to those of the WTO Appellate Body
and/ or the International Court of Justice. There would inevitably be certain costs associated
with the establishment of the body including a possible secretariat to help the appellate
members in their work. An appellate mechanism is a realistic possibility with the United
States. The US has included a reference to the possible creation of an appellate mechanism in
its agreements since 2002.

The proposal is fairly vague on this point, but it seems that the Commission is
considering an appellate body with judicial safeguards. My concerns in this respect are
the Commission’s apparent reticence about a dedicated secretariat for the appellate
body, which would be important for its independence, and its flagging of the issue of
whether the U.S. would even agree to this (or any other) proposals. This last proviso
reiterates that the Commission’s proposals can be evaluated properly only if laid out in
a legal text.
I. Response to the Commission’s further reforms on ISDS and domestic courts
The Commission’s final proposal relates to the criterion of subsidiarity.
In introducing this proposal, the Commission unfortunately sidetracks to a dubious
connection between the type of dispute resolution body—international versus
domestic—and the source of the legal obligations. The Commission sidetracks in this
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way in order to claim that ISDS is needed because domestic courts may not be in a
position to apply international law. Leaving aside this complex issue, the important
issue is not whether domestic law or international law is the source of justice and
protection for foreign investors (or anyone else) but rather whether adequate
protection and access to justice has been afforded by domestic courts, from the
perspective of international law. There is a variety of ways for the international
standard of protection and access to justice to be assessed internationally, such as by a
state-state tribunal or an international court.
In any event, the Commission at least acknowledges that “it still makes sense to try
and manage better the relationship between domestic (judicial) and international
(arbitration) remedies”. However, the Commission then limits the means of managing
this relationship to the avoidance of “the risk of double compensation (i.e. that
investors could get compensation under domestic law and international law for the
same damage)”. The Commission also takes a very narrow approach to the issue of
subsidiarity, saying that:
Both under CETA and the EU/Singapore FTA, investors must withdraw from any domestic
proceedings they may have started before submitting a claim to ISDS (this is the so-called “no
u-turn” approach). Parallel claims are thus prohibited.

This statement is misleading because in fact, in the CETA (again, following the U.S.
model), the foreign investor is required only to withdraw domestic proceedings that
lead to monetary remedies. As I elaborated in my submission to the Commission in
2014, the foreign investor can thus have its cake and eat it too; that is, the investor can
pursue monetary remedies in ISDS (where, dangerously, they are the primary remedy)
while pursuing non-monetary remedies in domestic law (where monetary remedies
are typically a secondary remedy for claims against the state acting in its sovereign
capacity).
The key element that is missing from the Commission’s proposal is a clear
commitment to the requirement that foreign investors—like everyone else—must go to
domestic courts first and seek an international remedy only if they show the domestic
remedies were not reasonably available. It has been a radical change for ISDS to have
relieved foreign investors of this conventional duty.
The Commission dances around this gap in its approach to ISDS by shifting to the
much less significant issue of parallel proceedings and by saying for example:
… investors may first seek to obtain redress in domestic courts, including by exhausting
domestic court proceedings, before possibly turning to ISDS where the treatment afforded
by the country [including by its domestic courts] still allegedly falls short of the basic
guarantees contained in the investment protection provisions of an international agreement.
The rationale of this approach is to encourage investors to primarily rely on domestic
remedies thus minimizing the potential number of ISDS claims.

The key word in this excerpt is the second word: “may”. Foreign investors are not
required to go to domestic courts before turning to ISDS. It is an option for foreign
investors, unlike for everyone else (who incidentally do not have access to anywhere
near the same wide-ranging and powerful protections enjoyed by foreign investors via
ISDS).
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The Commission goes on by highlighting some insignificant proposals for “fork-in-theroad” or “no u-turn” clauses. Neither of these clauses would establish ISDS as
subsidiary to domestic courts; neither has been applied effectively in most of the
relevant ISDS cases because the arbitrators have devised legal techniques to avoid
being limited by the clauses and to allow parallel treaty claims to go ahead, as noted in
my submission to the Commission in 2014. The Commission’s proposals on the
relationship between ISDS and domestic law are likewise not significant on the
criterion of subsidiarity.
As such, the Commission continues to endorse an enclave legal status to foreign
investors by allowing them to challenge the laws and other decisions that apply to
everyone, outside of the processes to which everyone else must resort. It is an
unjustified privileging of foreign investors. It clearly contradicts the principle of
subsidiarity in ISDS.
In summary, on subsidiarity, the Commission’s approach falls well short. It does not
mention issues related to contractually-agreed forums and to domestic legislators and
regulators. Most importantly, the Commission’s approach does not contemplate a duty
for foreign investors to use domestic courts before going to ISDS. This is a major gap
in the Commission’s approach.
J. Summary of responses to the Commission’s further reforms
The Commission refers to its TTIP proposals as “stepping stones” toward a
multilateral system of ISDS. This aspect of the Commission’s agenda causes me the
most concern.
Logically, one would expect the Commission to address existing treaties that rely on
the flawed system of ISDS before proposing to expand ISDS massively in a major new
deal with the U.S. From this perspective, the existing CETA and FTA texts are like lowhanging fruit, ready to be picked. Why would the Commission not make clear that it
will implement its vision for ISDS reform in the CETA and the FTA, both of which
offer contexts in which the Commission has more bargaining power? Likewise, both of
these other treaties leave the option of reform squarely on the table until they are
ratified.
The Commission’s lack of focus on these existing treaties suggests that it is
contemplating reforms for two apparent purposes. The first is to distract from its
endorsement of a deeply flawed ISDS system in the CETA. The second is to soften up
decision-makers for the prospect of a TTIP by offering potential ISDS reforms—all
dependent on agreement by a more powerful negotiating partner—to keep the ball
rolling.
This last aspect of the Commission’s proposal casts doubt on the whole enterprise.
That is, putting one’s faith in the Commission’s commitment to serious reform would
be misplaced until the Commission’s proposals are accompanied by a clear legal text
that is identified as a red line for all treaties negotiated by the Commission, including
the CETA and FTA. There are also serious gaps in the Commission’s reform approach,
even accepting that they are genuine proposals and wishing away the risk that key
components will be conceded in future negotiations, especially with the U.S.
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In particular:
•

On independence, (a) the Commission still refers to arbitrators instead of judges,
(b) the Commission does not commit to the arbitrators being paid a set salary
instead of operating for-profit, (c) the Commission does not replace the role of
executive officials in deciding conflict of interest claims with a proper judicial
process, and (d) the Commission does not commit to prohibiting arbitrators from
working as ISDS lawyers during (and from working as ISDS lawyers for a
reasonable period of, say, five years before and after) their service on the roster.
Notably, the Commission’s proposal for an appellate body also appears to
contemplate an ongoing role for for-profit arbitrators. More broadly, the
Commission appears to leave open the prospect that the same core group of
arbitrators would populate or dominate the roster.

•

On fairness, the Commission’s proposal is brief, but it signals that all affected
parties might be given a right of intervention. While this step would be positive, the
proposal lacks sufficient detail to evaluate it properly.

•

On openness, the Commission to its credit has moved away from the acceptance of
large-scale secrecy in ISDS, but its approach would still allow for secret settlements
with foreign investors before a formal ISDS document is filed. It also allows issues
of confidentiality to be resolved outside of a judicial process.

•

On subsidiarity, the Commission continues to avoid the elephant in the room. Why
should foreign investors be relieved from the usual requirement to go to domestic
courts first, unless they can show that domestic courts do not offer justice? The
point has been laid out in detail to the Commission; it is a deep concern that the
Commission has not incorporated this basic requirement. In turn, the Commission
appears to be set on continuing to give foreign investors an unjustified privileged
status, relative to everyone else. Finally, the Commission does not mention other
issues of subsidiarity concerning contractually-agreed forums, domestic legislators,
and domestic regulators.

•

On balance, the Commission offers a positive signal on the right to regulate. Yet,
the devil is in the details and, given the Commission’s misleading spin of this issue,
it seems prudent to wait for a precise legal text and a clear red line before relying
on the reform proposal. Also, the Commission has not ameliorated the serious risk
of potentially massive financial liability for states by limiting the remedy of
retrospective damages. That is a major omission. Finally, for anyone wanting
actionable responsibilities for foreign investors alongside their rights, the
Commission has avoided that issue of balance entirely.

In 2007, I floated an idea for an international investment court in an academic book
on ISDS. Yet, I am more melancholy than inspired by the Commission’s proposal to
create a “permanent investment court with tenured judges” due to the Commission’s
approach to sequencing. It is very clear that the priority should be to replace ISDS in
existing treaties, including those that have been negotiated and that are still within the
Commission’s power. The idea of a permanent court should not be used to justify a
massive expansion of ISDS in the TTIP, based on ambiguous promises of institutional
reform.
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I have seen quite a few reforms proposals that were deeply flawed but still promoted
heavily by trade ministries and the ISDS legal industry. I’ve learned to wait for the text
before accepting promises of ensuring independence, fairness, openness, subsidiarity,
or balance. So far, in every case, the “reforms” that emerged in the texts have led to the
same destination: the unjustified privileging of foreign investors—especially the most
powerful and wealthy actors in the world—and a serious threat to democracy, courts,
and public budgets.
This last comment is not meant to detract from the efforts of those working to achieve
a better process for resolving disputes about foreign investment. It is to say that I will
believe it when I see it. In the meantime, I wait for evidence of a commitment to fixing
what is wrong now in the CETA and FTA instead of making things much worse by
putting ISDS in the TTIP.
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